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EMERGENCY MEDICAL SERVICES IN MOSCOv]
Edward H. Blum
1. Introduction
1.1 Background
At the invitation of the Soviet Coromittee for Systems
Analysis, I visited Moscow in May 1975, to discuss mutual
research interests with Soviet scientists and managers. One
of the discussion sessions focussed on emergency medical
services (EMS), centering in particular on ambulance and
associated services in the city of Moscow. Though brief,
this session provided a valuable exchange of information,
research results, and ideas. It also provided a useful basis
for future discussions.
This paper presents main points about f.1oscow' s EMS
distilled from the session, augmented by parallel research,
and notes areas that could fruitfully be pursued in further
discussions.
1.2 First Impressions--Ouality Services
Worth emphasizing at the outset is the apparent quality
of Soviet activity in this field, highlighted by the material
presented in the session. As this paper indicates, emergency
medical services in the Soviet Union receive more attention
and more resources than do EMS in other advanced countries.
And, though confirmation was not possible in the brief session,
the results appear to be of commensurahly high quality.
In terms of systems analysis, experts in the session
revealed the existence of a sizeable body of research; from
the limited information thus far made available, parts of
this appear to be conceived more broadly, executed more
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thoroughly, and applied more successfully than comparable
work elsewhere. In practical terms, though time did not
permit viewing actual service delivery, examination of the
central ambulance dispatching center, followed by discussion
of central management and operating issues, also yielded
favorable impressions.
1.3 Others' Impressions
Moscow is proud of its emergency medical services, and
Western observers have been appreciative. At least five
accounts [3, 4, 5, la, 11, 12] share my impressions. The
Chicago Tribune's f1oscow correspondent is particularly lauda-
tory: Jackson [3] terms the Moscow ambulance service "among
the world's best," and approvingly quotes an observer who
calls it "one of the smoothest and best organizations in
Moscow," with "crews superbly trained."
Osnos [5] cites the "demonstrated skill and speed of
Soviet emergency rescue services," and describes how American
researchers seeking to test an experimental drug (hyaluroni-
dase) to reduce the amount of lasting injury from specific
forms of heart failure chose Moscow's EBS, in part because
of the large numbers of surviving "heart attack" victims.
American physicians Storey and Roth [4] are also favorable,
though focussing more on Leningrad and Kiev; their information
on Moscow is second-hand.
Australian physicians Petrovsky and Maxwell, in concluding
an informative but brief review [10] based on a 1972 trip to
the Soviet Union, remark "We were most impressed with the
equipment and staffing of the specialized ambulances and the
quick, efficient cover provided for medical emergencies."
The brief articles by Scribner, Raithaus, and Ivanov [11 and
12, identical except for discussion following 12] reflect
greater experience; t!1ese h·m Americans and one Russian had
worked in the system. Their summary notes: "Emphasis has
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been placed on the areas in which the Soviet system seems
superior to those that are only now emerging in the united
States."
These publications confirm my initial impressions of high
quality service and provide worthwhile information supple-
menting that presented at the session. But all are quite
brief and--to a scientific reader--vague about details.
The picture of the ｍ ｯ ｳ ｣ ｯ ｾ EMS that emerges is favorable, but
disappointingly incomplete.
1.4 Needed Developments
The operational director of MOscow's EMS, Dr. Nikolai 'i.
Kaverin, has stated that he finds Western Ef1S specialists
surprisingly ill-informed ahout Hoscow's policies and practices.
Indeed, MOscow's EMS should be much better known and more widely
studied. Whatever the reason for the over-general and incom-
plete reporting thus far, it would seem greatly to Moscow's
advantage to help remedy it.
If the quality and advanced state-of-the-art that appear
to be present in the Moscow EMS are truly to be acknowledged
and accepted by naturally skeptical scientists and managers
in other countries, the impressions reported to date will
need to be seriously confirmed, then supported, reinforced,
and documented with data, analytical and scientific details,
and further observations.
An immediate approach would be to make research reports,
materials, and further operating information available for
wide dissemination as analytical examples and practical cases
in the IIASA state-of-the-art Honograpl!, "Systems Analysis,
Planning, and Management of Hunicipal Emergency Services [1] "
In addition, reports with important results could be approved
for external distribution or publication.
Scientifically documented, these analyses and service
details could attest to Soviet accomplishment in an important
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health and life-saving area. And they could potentially
benefit analysts, service managers, and ultimately citizens
in many countries.
1.5 Comments
This paper presents a draft of material that, with the
additional information noted in the preceding section, could
be included in the monograph [1]. It also provides a written
basis for mutual clarification and further discussions.
Readers' suggestions to improve the paper will be espe-
cially appreciated. The oral exchange in the initial discus-
sions, with translation of questions from English to Russian
followed by translation of answers from Russian to English,
through relatively non-technical interpreters, may have intro-
duced misunderstanding or errors. All corrections, additions,
and criticism are welcome.
- 5 -
2. Initial Discussions
2.1 Participants
Participating in the session at the Ministry of Health
Care of the USSR, Hoscow, 29 May 1975, were:
1. Dr. Sergei A. Sigayev, a senior official of the
Ministry of Health Care responsible for Emergency
Medical Services;
2. Dr. Nikolai M. Kaverin, Chief Hedical Officer,
Emergency Health Service, City of Moscow;
3. G.F. Tserkovny, of the Ministry of Health Care,
involved with national technical planning in ｅ ｍ ｓ ［ ｾ
4. L.G. Sudarikov, Ministry of Health Care;
5. ｉ Ｎ ｾ Ｑ Ｎ Beskrovny, the Sklifasovsky Institute for
Emergency Medical Service, MOscow;
6. V.G. Zaporischenko, Institute for Medical and
Medical-Technical Information, MOscow;
7. V.F. Marynenko, The Semashko Institute, Moscow;
8. Mrs. Svetlana Gladysheva, a translator with the
International Scientific Organizations group at
the Institute of Control Sciences, M.oscow. (She
graciously served as interpreter, hostess, and
guide for much of the visit.)
9. Miss Tanya ----, a translator with a heart-research
institute in Moscow.
This paper owes much to them for their time, interest,
and cooperation, which are sincerely appreciated.
2.2 Next Steps
As the first part of the initial discussions neared a
close, the senior Soviet official present (Dr. Sigayev)
suggested a follow-up seminar in Moscow for the Autumn of
1975. For the agenda, he suggested discussion of results
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developed and synthesized in IIASA's work that might be
applicable to the ｾ Ｑ ｯ ｳ ｣ ｯ ｷ emergency medical service, coupled
with more intensive discussions of research and practice in
Soviet EMS. Dr. Sigayev's suggestion was strongly seconded,
then, and in subsequent ､ ｩ ｳ ｣ ｵ ｳ ｳ ｩ ｯ ｮ ｳ ｾ by Dr. Kaveriri.
Such a seminar and mutual exchange could prove most
worthwhile, particularly if details of Soviet research analy-
ses, and operations are made available for dissemination.
Part of a possible list of topics for such discussion is out-
lined in Section 6.
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3. Moscov; EBS--Organization
3.1 Prologue
The author's paper, WP-75-137 [2], outlines the general
structure of EMS, noting their role in the health care system,
alternative points of entry, and key determinants of quality
in operations. Throughout that paper are explicit and implicit
prescriptions for effective EMS performance. These are drawn
from analyses of the EMS system and specific services, and
distilled from operational practices in a number of leading
cities around the world.
To my knowledge, no emergency medical service in any
city now follows all these prescribed policies and practices.
A number of excellent services apply quite a few. And of
these, the Boscow E!1S appears, from the information thus far
available, to employ the greatest number.
Whether this is a suitable index of quality may, of
course, be debated; more specific and cetailed performance
measures are not yet available. Certainly it does not imply
perfection. Indeed, the director of the r1oscow EJ.1S and his
colleagues have stated publicly that many features of the
service still need improvement, and sizeable new programs
are underway. Yet, as noted earlier, t.he HoscO\\' EMS merits
examination.
This section describes the Moscow EMS's organizational
setting and roles. Section 4 discusses the level of service
provided, and some analyses that seem to have been done.
Section 5 examines control systems--dispatching and over-all
quality control--again noting supporting research. Finally,
Section 6 notes some areas where the Moscow EMS may yet be
able to improve its services, based on research and experience
elsewhere, and outlines some major questions that should be
pursued in further discussions.
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3.2 Background
The capital and largest city of the USSR, Moscow is
estimated to have about 7,200,000 people residing within its
city limits, which cover roughly 870 km2 (or about 340 mi 2).
Approximately another million people daily commute to the city
from surrounding suburbs. In size, therefore, Hoscm·.T is
comparable to New York City (which has about ten percent more
people in about seven percent less area) and Greater London
(which has roughly the same population in eighty percent more
area) .
The form of Moscow's city government, and its budgetary
and political relations with higher levels of government, are,
of course, very different from those of either New York City
or Greater London, flowing as they do from the highly central-
ized style of the Soviet Union and MOscow's special role as
a national focal point. Compared with New York and London,
for example, MOscow's city government appears quite large,
for it includes many activities that in Western countries
are performed by the private sector.
Yet, despite this size, as Ofer [6] shows, "An outstand-
ing feature of the Soviet economy is the relatively small
volume of services produced. The place of most types of
services in the economy is notably small when the USSR is
compared with other countries at the same or even lower levels
of development." This "service gap" is observed to hold for
public administration as well as for trade, etc. In part,
Ofer notes, this situation stems from r1arxist doctrine that
services are "unproductive," and thus not appropriate areas
for investment. One minor result is that one may find, for
example, some firemen and police listed in official figures
under "housing industry" [6, p.26].
Ofer's figures show that health services, in general,
also have fewer personnel per capita than other comparably
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advanced countries. But the USSR has a very large number of
highly trained health service personnel, especially doctors.
Out of a total population of approximately 250 million, the
USSR has an estimated 560,000 physicians and persons with
equivalent training, comparatively many per capita and a high
proportion of all skilled and professional workers*. And
within health services, emergency medical services receive
special emphasis nationwide [7].
3.3 National context
Emergency medical services in the USSR are organized as
an integral element of a formal, centralized national health
care system, with local operational flexibility. At the top
of the system, responsible for shaping and guiding all health
care activities throughout the country, stands the national
Ministry of Health Care of the USSR (Ministerstvo Zdravook-
hraneniya SSSR, also translated as Ministry of Public Health
of the USSR), centered in Moscow. Just below the ｾ Ｑ ｩ ｮ ｩ ｳ ｴ ･ ｲ of
Health Care ranks the national chief administrator for
Emergency Medical Services (Skoraya Beditsinskaya Pomoch);
his standing is equivalent to those who administer national
medicine, surgery, research institutes, and outpatient clinics,
placing EMS at a high level, indeed.
The national ministry plans, coordinates, and ｭ ｡ ｾ ･ ｳ
general policy, and oversees research dnd development needed
to advance the state of the art. It also has central hudget-
ary authority and concomitant power to enforce its plans,
which are carried out at regional and local levels. In EMS,
*The Statistical Abstract of the United States reports
(pp. 807-808 in the 1972 edition) 1969 Soviet figures showing
555,400 physicians, yielding a ratio of roughly 450 persons
per physician; this compares quite favorably with ratios of
700 persons/physician in the United States and 600 in Germany,
for example. The figure of 640,000 physicians given in [4]
and picked up in [11] and [12] includes dentists, and thus
is not the most appropriate number to use in discussing EMS.
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for example, the entire national EMS hudgpt is allocated first
to the central Skoraya directorate in the ninistry of Health
Care [11]. It then parcels out the mcney to the f1inistries
of Health in the constituent republics, which are responsible
for translating the national plans, goals, and service standards
into detailed plans for particular regions. For Moscow (and
a large part of the rest of the Soviet Union), the cognizant
intermediate authority is the RSFSR Ministry of Health, which
operates in a formal chain of command through the Head of the
City Department of Health.
The local EMS director apparently reports through two
chains of cornmand--to the City Department of Health, in which
EMS is one division, and to the Skoraya directorate in the
national Ministry. In spite or because of this, he seems to
retain considerable local discretion in the use of funds,
equipment, and manpower, within the norms established nationally.
In particular, the number and positioning of ambulances are tIle
responsibility of local authorities [11].
Having set standards and allocated funds, the national
Ministry then monitors and evaluates the local Departments of
Health for quality control and for cODipliance with national
requirements. In EMS, national analytical staff (e.g., from
the Semashko Institute) work with local services on problems
of national importance as well as on quality control. Moscow
EMS have their own analytical staff for purely local problems;
in small cities, the national or regional Hinistry presumably
assists with local consulting, ｾ ｳ well.
3.4 Organizational Objectives
Throughout the USSR, Skoraya is charged with five
official functions [4]:
(1) Prompt response to calls for emergency assistance,
to bring the best medical care to the site of
accidents -(e.g., wounds, fractures, burns, poisoning)
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and sudden, life-threatening illness (e.g., sudden
loss of consciousness, acutely develooing cardiac
dysfunction, acute respiratory difficulty, hemor-
rhage). It is to provide service at the site, and
to transport to appropriate hospitals all patients
in need of immediate hospitalization.
(2) Assuring the transport and hospitalization of preg-
nant women when labor has begun, or earlier if a
doctor indicates possible pathologies or problems.
(3) Maintenance of registration data on all hospital
beds in the service area, keeping track of daily
census and patient flow.
(4) Delivery of preserved blood in urgent cases.
(5) Organization of services and posting of medical
personnel at events with concentrations of large
numbers of people.
Of these functions, three (#1, 2, 5) are performed in
some form by EMS in most countries. Function #1 is ambulance
operation, as described in section III of WP-75-136; #2 handles
a special emergent prohlem, presumably attempting to antici-
pate (and minimize) potential complications; #5 pre-positions
services temporarily in locations where (probabilistically,
and because of possible interactive effects in crowds) they
seem especially likely to he needed.
The City of Moscow EMS has augmented these official
objectives and assumed additional responsibilities. In
carrying out function #3, for example, Moscow dispatching
center personnel telephone all receiving hospitals in the City
four times each day for up-to-date information on available
beds. They also use the detailed records kept on all patients
to maintain a file noting where each patient (including those
admitted to the hospital directly) is at a given time, so that
doctors, anxious relatives, visitors, etc., can locate anyone
readily [10].
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In its ambulance service, Moscow has carried further
the national emphasis on bringing medical care to the site
of serious incidents. A major objective for its service is
to provide as much medical assistance as possible at the site,
and to transport and hospitalize only people truly needing
continued medical attention. This distinctive objective
strongly influences its policies and pLactices--affecting
the composition of crews, the types of vehicles used and the
equipment supplied to them, the training of command-and-control
personnel, dispatching and control procedures, and the numbers
of crews and vehicles supplied. On this last point, for
example, more service at the site means longer service times
which, with Hoscow's high demand for service, require greater
resources to maintain the same availability under peak loads.
The vast majority of patients who need to be hospitalized
are brought to one of the five major emergency hospitals dis-
persed about the city [11]. Moscow has few large general
hospitals; indeed, throughout the Soviet union hospitals tend
to be much more specialized than those in most Western countries.
Within the emergency hospitals, there are specialized clinics
that handle the non-routine cases in the major categories of
emergency medicine: trauma and resuscitation (termed "reanima-
tion" in Russian); neurology (e.g., strokes); cardiology; acute
abdomen (e.g., appendicitis); toxicology (e.g., poisoning);
psychiatric emergencies; and pediatric.
To maintain high-quality medical practice, these specialty
clinics are linked professionally through Institutes of
Traumatology, Neurology, Toxicology, etc. Since emergency
medicine is considered a full-fledged field in itself, there
is also an Institute for Emergency Medical Services--the
Sklifosovsky Institute, which comprises the main emergency
hospital (with 600 beds) and a sizeable research and teaching
center. The central ambulance station and dispatching center
adjoin the Sklifosovsky Institute, and maintain close ties.
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By treating emergency medicine as a major specialty and
giving it elevated status (with clout) in the health care
hierarchy, the Soviet Union appears to have obviated some of
the coordination and follow-through problems that afflict
EMS in many other countries. In the emergency hospitals to
which EMS patients typically are brouqht. Skoraya physicians
have a central role and close working relationships with the
in-hospital specialists. In their training, Skoraya physicians
rotate through the specialty wards (and potentially the spe-
cialty institutes), and emphasize diagnostic training to help
them assign emergent patients to the correct specialists [12).
And in these hospitals, Skoraya shares responsibility and
authority for quality control.
This central role is also important at tr..e intake end,
when help is first requested. The fire service and police
(militia) do not have separate EMS vehicles; they must use
Skoraya, with which they are linked directly via radiotele-
phone. When appropriate, the militia may accompany the EMS to
the hospital, but only occasionally (e.g., a loud drunk who
has bruised himself) will the military cars take people
directly to the hospital themselves. Moreover, Skoraya
provides the central and ultimate service for the auxiliary
medical posts around t1oscow independently operated by institu-
tions, factories, stores, hotels, and the subway system. The
Moscow HETRO, for example, has special medical posts manned
by feldshers (advanced nurses) in major stations and station
complexes*; these have instant (dedicated line) telephone
access to the Skoraya dispatching center.
*This is what was interpreted as having been said in the
meeting. Storey and Roth [4), however, state that each of
Moscow's 80 METRO stations has a post with 5 feldshers.
While not critical, this discrepancy should be cleared up.
- 14 -
Skoraya also plays a central role in accident prevention.
It is responsible for registering all accidents with the
Division of Traffic, the Police, the 11oscow Soviet, the City
Health Department, the Department of Education, and other
organizations concerned with particular aspects of public
safety [4]. Its staff analyze street and home accidents,
develop preventive measures jointly with the appropriate
agencies, and participate in programs for preventive educa-
tion [4]. [Whether these preventive activities have been
assessed to determine their effectiveness has not been noted.
ror is it clear how much effort, including detailed analysis
and planning, is really devoted to prevention, which most
response-oriented services stress as an objective but tend to
slight in operations.]
Finally, the Moscow Skoraya operates a sizeable Department
of Patient Transportation, as do most major ambulance services
throughout the world. This Department contains several spe-
cialized divisions, including the mandatory service for expec-
tant mothers and a special service for transporting infectious
patients. Transport service is provided only on a doctor's
request. [Little more seems to have been published about the
transport service, which does not appear to receive the emphasis
in Moscow that it does in comparable cities in other countries.
It would be useful to know how this Department is viewed
officially, (e.g., as an important service to Moscow's moderately
ill or disabled citizens or as a necessary but minor service
that distracts resources from true emergencies) and whether
analyses (e.g., scheduling and routing algorithms) have been
·applied to it.]
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4. Levels of Service
One clear indication of EMS' role and status in Soviet
health care is the high level of service provided--a level that
requires large numbers of highly trained personnel and large
quantities of technical equipment. This section describes
the types of EMS units supplied, their crews and equipment,
the numbers and locations of the units, with approximate
performance indicators, and some service level criteria that
appear to be used, with an incomplete example of how they
have been applied analytically.
4.1 EMS Units, Crews, and Equipment
At least since 1961, Soviet EMS have used three types of
units to respond to calls. The type of unit sent is matched
to the probable nature and urgency of the call, as evaluated
by the dispatcher.
The least serious calls receiving a response (some
callers are simply referred to a clinic) are sent a house-car,
a radio car manned by a feldsher (nurse) or doctor that makes
house calls to people who sound as if they may be sick (e.g.,
with a fever, persistent cough, or moderate pains) but not in
need of emergency care [12]. This service then treats the
patient and/or refers him to a clinic or specialists for fur-
ther treatment. Similar services exist in other countries,
e.g., the Funk ｾ ｲ ｺ ｴ in Vienna.
General urgent or emergency calls are dispatched a line
ambulance, a two-stretcher van manned by one doctor, one or
two feldshers or nurses, and a driver. Most of Moscow's
ambulances fall into this category. Jackson [3] notes that
in practice the line ambulances are sometimes short-handed
and must go out without a nurse, pressing the doctor and
driver to assist as stretcher bearers.
When the dispatcher decides that a particular call
indicates a very serious, specialized prohlem, she may
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assign one of the limited numbers of specialized ambulance
teams (termed II specialty brigades"), ""hich respond with an
lIemergency rOom on wheels." Specialty brigades have been
organized in Moscow for
o Cardiological emergencies
o Trauma, anti-shock, resuscitation
o Toxicological emergencies (poisoning)
o Neurological emergencies (mainly II s troke")
o Acute abdomen
o Pediatric emergencies
o Obstetrical emergenciesi
ln addition, there is a psychiatric brigade (manned by
psychiatrists) for mental emergencies. These teams comprise
two doctors (one a specialist), one feldsher or nurse (trained
to serve also as a laboratory assistant), a medical orderly,
and a driver.
All EMS units are connected with the dispatching center
and the emergency hospitals by radiotelephone.' Each vehicle
has its own channel in a band reserved nation\vide for Skoraya.
Governing the medical equipment the ambulances carry
are special guidelines promulgated nationally and extended in
major cities such as !1oscow. Line ambulances typically carry
stretchers, artificial respiration apparatus, suction equip-
ment, a range of drugs, splints and bandages, etc., anaesthetic
(e.g., nitrous oxide), intravenous supplies and equipment,
oxygen, and selected kits for on-site emergency operations
(e.g., tracheotomies, obstetrics). The line ambulances are
deliberately kept relatively Spartan insider and their ride is
reputedly hard and jerky, but swift [3J. Specialized ambulances
carry a range of appropriate laboratory equipment and special-
ized equipment and drugs such as defibrillators, electro-
cardiographs, poison antidotes, etc.
The presence of at least one physician on every ambulance
follows naturally from the objective of providing as much
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service as possible at the site. Having a doctor present
immediately ensures the best feasible on-site treatment without
delay. It also presumably minimizes the chance that a patient
in need of immediate help will be misdiagnosed and subjected
to handling and transport that will worsen his condition.
And doctors on the site can treat quickly cases that turn out
to be minor, discharging the people rather than transporting
them and burdening hospital emergency rooms. Indeed, 70
percent of the calls for line ambulances in Moscow are so
treated; only 30 percent of the cases need to be brought to a
hospital [3, 4].
Though medical education is shorter than in most Western
countries, EMS doctors in the USSR have extensive training
[11, 12]. Typically, men and women (roughly 50% of the
doctors are women) become physicians about age 22. After
graduating, those interested in EMS take a six-month course
in emergency medicine at a major emergency hospital. They then
begin service as Skoraya generalists, ｷ ｯ ｲ ｫ ｩ ｾ ｧ three to four
months out of the year in various specialty brigades to gain
experience. After about a year, they can become Skoraya
specialists, working 3-4 months of the year on the specialized
ambulances and spending the remaining time in the specialty
wards of emergency hospitals. Weekly conferences, often with
case reviews and analyses, form the backbone of a continuing
education program.
When on the ambulances, Skoraya physicians typically work
an average of about 40 hours per week, in shifts of about 12
hours each followed by a day or more off. The time between
runs seems most often spent simply relaxing. Most of the
doctors on the ambulances are said to be relatively young;
one might expect that they eventually tire of emergency
responses and pursue more serene practices. Once doctors
have become established in Skoraya. however, the odds are that
they will remain with Skoraya in one capacity or another for
the rest of their careers [12].
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Doctors are outnumbered by nurses and paramedical
personnel about 2 or 3 to 1, in various parts of the system.
Curiously, however, the ambulance driver is given next to no
medical training and is not considered part of the team;
indeed, drivers are formally not even EMS personnel.
4.2 Unit Numbers and Locations
On a typical day, between 3000 and 6000 Muscovites call
their EMS for emergency service--an annual average of nearly
one call for every five people living and working in the city.
Driven by this enormous demand, Moscow supplies large numbers
of ambulances and crews--currently about 600 line ambulances,
one for every 12,000 people*. All 600 are staffed and on
duty during the l2-hour day shift; only half that number are
left to serve at night, when call volumes are lower. This
number of ambulances has tripled since 1970, when there were
200 [4], and plans call for expanding the fleet over the next
few years to about 720, to attain a level of one emergency
ambulance for every 10,000 people.
Though Moscow covers a large area, for ease of command
and control the ambulances are grouped into 27 substations
(each with 20-25 ambulances) distributed about the city; this
number is up from 22 only a few years before. [The methods
used to determine the number and locations of these new sub-
stations would be of considerable interest.] Each substation
covers a specific region (response area) with a radius of
about 3.3 kill, forming a quasi-indepenoent dispatching unit for
about 270,000 people. The number of ambulances assigned to a
substation depends on the demand for service in the region it
covers.
* .The number has apparently lncreased so fast that Jackson
[3], writing only 3 months before my visit, was cited a figure
of 500.
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Average response distances run about 3 km and maximum
travel is restricted to under 12 km. These distances, together
with ｾ Ｑ ｯ ｳ ｣ ｯ ｷ Ｇ ｳ comparatively light traffic, yield maximum total
response times (measured from the time the call is first
received) on the order of 8 to 12 minutes. These times are
viewed as not fast enough.
A leading Soviet resuscitation specialist, Dr. Armen
Bunatian, has stated [3], "The first five minutes are all-
important." Based upon such thinking, the USSR has begun
programs to train nearly all citizens in basic first-aid
techniques [9]. Similar efforts on a smaller scale in the
United States appear to have had successful results, as have
programs focussed on automobile accidents in the Federal
Republic of Germany and Sweden. As [2] notes, immediate first-
aid by fellow citizens at the scene is often crucial to keeping
seriously injured or ill victims alive long enough to benefit
from professional help.
Staffing the 600 emergency ambulances are 2000 doctors,
supported by 4000 additional EMS personnel, excluding drivers
(and excluding the Department of Patient Transportation)*.
By way of comparison, in the year ended 31 March 1973, the
Greater London Council Ambulance Service (now operated through
Great Britain's National Health Service) provided 404 emergency
ambulances (capable of carrying 2 to 4 stretchers) with a total
crew staff of 2091 [8], only a fraction of whom were full-
fledged physicians.
* .AssUffilng each ambulance always carries one doctor implies
3.33 doctors per position. To staff a position 168 hours per
week with people working 40 hours per week, allowing for vaca-
tions, sickness, and various official absences requires at
least 4.4 people (in New York City, it requires closer to 5).
On the average, then only 75% of the positions could be staffed
around the clock. It thus seems clear that, as described above,
Moscow continues to staff half its ambulances 24 hours per day,
and half 12 hours per day, as [4] notes it did in 1970.
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In our conversation following the formal session,
Dr. Kaverin noted that the Moscow Skoraya emergency service
budget totalled 15 million rubles for 1974, of which 70 percent
was designated for personnel*. In comparison, London's
budget for 1972-73 was £8.5 million, of which 64.4 percent
went for personnel [8]. At an official exchange rate then
of about £1 = R2, Mosco,v's budget charge per person would be
roughly one-third London's--illustrating the difficulty of
comparing monetary figures, especially salaries, across quite
different economies.
4.3 Service Level Criteria and Analyses
4.3.1 Theoretical Background
As explicated in chapters prepared for [1], the basic
purpose of emergency services is to provide a form of physical
insurance against risk. All people pay relatively small,
certain costs (e.g., public expenditures) for a degree of
protection against potentially very costly, uncertain events
that might afflict some of them. Emergency services thus
provide both protection--in the form of physical services to
minimize the adverse impacts of events that do occur--and
security, in the form of reduced uncertainty (and potential
anxiety) about the future.
Basic criteria for determining service levels thus must
include (a) minimization of serious risk and (b) assurance of
the desired degree of certainty. Unlike fire protection,
where the risk level should a fire occur varies significantlY
with building type, age, occupancy, etc., and thus with loca-
tion, the inherent risk in events requiring EMS (e.g., potential
*Assuming doctors earn roughly twice what the others are
paid (Western ratios are nearer three), the average salaries
would be about R2600/yr. for the doctors and R1300/yr. for
the others.
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severity or possibility of death) varies only slightly with
geography. Calls from accident-prone intersections, blocks
with concentrations of elderly people, etc., may be somewhat
more likely to represent serious conditions. But, in general,
EMS planners may assume that potential risk from demands is
relatively homogeneous geographically*, and focus attention
on the call rates themselves.
Emergency service theory shows how demand patterns affect
decisions about numbers and locations of service units. First,
there must be enough units and enough different locations to
provide the required spatial coverage--i.e., to ensure that
all sites of potentially serious demands will have units close
enough (in latent response time) to them. The actual locations
are likely to be chosen to minimize some weighted disutility--
perhaps response time (tl, weighted by call rate (A) [and, more
generally, by potential loss, risk, or hazard], or some function
of response time f(tl thought to represent better the impact of
delay on the waiting patient. In Great Britain, for example,
the location standard now being considered for smaller cities
and suburban areas stresses the tail of the response time
distribution: It requires 50% of all responses to be made in
8 minutes or less and 95% in 20 minutes or less.
Second, there must be enough manpower to handle large
events (e.g., building collapse). This poses no problem for
large cities such as Moscow. Finally, there must be enough
units to serve peak-period demands and yet retain minimal
coverage. That is, when call rates are highest, there must be
enough units not busy to keep tolerably low the probability
that response to a new serious incident would be unacceptably
delayed.
*One should, of course, test this assumption by plotting
or otherwise comparing the spatial distribution of calls that
turned out to be serious or-resulted in lasting injury or death.
(Transient collective risks such as sporting events are already
covered by EMS policy; see section 3.4, item 5.)
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4.3.2 Moscow's Practices
As described in the session, the criterion used to set
the number of ambulances in Moscow is peak-period coverage--
in particular, the probability that a person applying for
help would find at least one ambulance free. A minimally
acceptable (or "cut-off") level for this probability is stip-
ulated. Then the number of ambulances needed is determined
through a queueing model, given the distributions of call
rates and service times, and system protocols (pertaining
especially to call priorities, possibly including shunting or
queueing of low-priority calls, and inter-district dispatching).
Just what protocols are used, what queueing models are
applied, and what cut-off probability is stipulated remain to
be clarified. From the information that was presented, how-
ever, we may conjecture that they are roughly as follows:
(a) Call priorities are reflected mainly in the choice
of vehicle type and crew (Section 4.1). Obvious
low priority calls are shunted to house-cars at
all times (except, perhaps, at the slowest hours
in the middle of the night), and calls appearing to
reauire a line ambulance are not permitted to queue.
Inter-district dispatching is only a last resort
under normal conditions. However, ambulances will
be sent from several substations· when a large
number are needed at one time, so that no one area
will be stripped.
(b) Though service times are not distributed exponen-
tially (lognormal, or a Fischer Type III distri-
bution, is usually closer to measurements elsewhere),
one can adequately represent the probability that at
least one ambulance will be available by the classical
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formulae for the queueing system M/M/c (c, FIFO).*
Let us define
A - Average number of calls per hour in the region
requiring line ambulances:
ｬ Ｏ ｾ - Average time an ambulance is unavailable while
serving a call;
c - Number of ambulances serving the region;
PA - Probability that at ｬ ｣ ｾ ｡ ｳ ｴ one ambulance will
be free:
ｐ ｾ - 1 - PA = Probability that all the ambulances
will be busy.
Then the well-known "Erlang loss formula" gives
pI =
C
ＭａＯｾ c
e ＨａＯｾＩ /c! (1)
If calls are allowed to queue (be held to await a free
ambulance) when all ambulances are bU3y, then one may use ,the
model MIMic (00, FIFO), which yields an equally well-known
formula for ｐ ｾ which we need not reproduce here. This value
for ｐ ｾ is obviously larger than (1), since the aueued calls
absorb local capacity not absorbed by calls shunted to another
substation. Indeed, as c increases for a given ａ Ｏ ｾ Ｌ
pI (oo)/P' (c) converges from below to 1/(1 - ａＯｃｾＩＮ
c c
*This shorthand means Poisson-distributed arrivals
(calls), exponentially distributed service times, f equiv-
alent servers (ambulances), total capacity only for f
customers at one time (i.e., no holding of calls waiting for
a free ambulance), and First-In-First-Out (i.e., order-of-
arrival) service discipline.
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Peak-period call rates can be estimated from two pieces
of information presented at the session:
(a) Call rates range approximately between 3000 and 6000
requests for line ambulances per day city-wide;
and
(b) During busy periods, ambulances typically make 16
to 20 responses per day.
In addition, it was noted that--as in other large cities--
call rates in Moscow vary significantly with month (season),
day of the week, time of day, and region within the city.
From (a), one can estimate the peak A for a region of
270,000 people served by one substation:
A ｾ 6000 calls
7··200000 people
- 1 call/day- _ 225 calls/day
1200 people 270,000 people
Assuming 60% of all calls are received in the peak 9-hour
period (roughly 1500 to 2400 with the heaviest rates between
1600 and 2200), one obtains for peak hours
A ;:; (225) (0.6) ｾ 15 calls/hr.
9 270,000 people
Using (b), assume the same hourly distribution for the
full-time ambulances in the peak period. Taking a middle
figure of 18 calls per day, with 1 full-time ambulance per
24,000 people, yields a peak
_ (18) (0.6)
AF - 9
calls/hr.
24,000 people
13.5 calls/hr.
270,000 people
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for the full-time ambulances alone. In addition, an equal
number of dayshift-only ambulances operate in the peak period.
These two pieces of data thus seem to yield rather different
estimates. Better, more detailed information is clearly
necessary if we are to be able to represent this part of the
planning process accurately and fairly.
The average service time (from receipt of the dispatch
by the ambulance to discharge of its patient--probably not
including time for cleanup and restocking supplies) was cited
as 40 minutes, which may reflect the 70% rate of discharge
at the scene (see Section 4.1). Thus W ｾ 1.5 per hour. For
A ｾ 15 per hour, A/W - 10; for A ｾ 27 per hour (assuming
A - 2A F ), A/W ｾ 18. Standard tables and charts for ｰ ｾ Ｈ ｯ ｯ Ｉ
and ｐ ｾ Ｈ ｣ Ｉ [e.g., A.M. Lee, Applied Queueing Theory, Macmillan,
London, 1966; p. 240] show
For A/W - 10, pI (00) - 0.004 for c = 20c
pI (00)
- 0.001 for c = 22c
For A/W - IS, pI (00) - 0.06 for c = 26C
pi (00)
- 0.0065 for c = 30c
Since Moscow has chosen values of c generally in the range
20-25, we may surmise that peak values of A/W now lie between
10 and lS--probably about 13--and that the "cut-off probability"
or design level of pI is 0.001. [Surmisal is, however, not a
c
satisfactory substitute for the facts.]
Using these estimates, we can also shed some light on
response times and possible gains from redeployment into more
widely distributed locations. The typical total response time
is probably now about S to S 1/2 minutes, of which about
2 1/4 minutes are consumed in the dispatching center (see the
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next section), about 1 1/2 minutes are consumed in "turnout
time" (from ｲ ･ ｾ ･ ｩ ｰ ｴ of the dispatch order to when the ambu-
lance has its full crew aboard and out onto the street,
accelerating), and about 4 1/4 to 5 minutes are taken to
travel the average distance of 3 km at 35-45 km/hr. average
speed (assumed faster than the average speed in more congested
cities). For a substation having 25 ambulances and ａ Ｏ ｾ - 13,
the average number of ambulances available during peak periods
is 12. From the "square root law,"* applying American results
for travel-time versus travel-distance**, one can estimate
that the travel time component could potentially be reduced by
2 1/2 to 3 1/2 minutes--which would reduce the total response
time to more like 5 minutes, and possibly to as low as 4 1/4
minutes once the new dispatching system is operational.
Analysts at the session argued that saving "lor 2 minutes"
was not justified in terms of the cost of new substations, and
that wider dispersion was "not resonable." [Perhaps that is
so--but it should be examined in detail, scrutinizing whatever
studies in this area ｲ ｾ ｯ ｳ ｣ ｯ ｷ Ｇ s EMS has done, together with
deployment and dispatching strategies that follow from the
work of this author and his colleagues.]
*P. Kolesar and E.H. Blum, Hanagement Science--Appli-
cations, 19, 1368-1378 (1973).
**P. Kolesar, Operations Research, ｾ Ｇ 603-613 (1975).
P. Kolesar, W. Walker, and J. Hausner, Operations
Research, ｾ Ｇ 614-627 (1975).
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5. Control ｓ ｹ ｳ ｴ ･ ｭ ｾ
This section describes Moscow's EMS dispatching system,
outlines recent analysis of call priority assessment, and
notes some means used for quality control.
5.1 Dispatching System
Persons needing EMS anywhere ln the Soviet Union dial
03, which connects them directly with their local EMS dis-
patching center. Should they have dialed one of the other
emergency number--Ol for police or 02 for fire--they can be
switched to the EMS center as soon as the answering officer
discerns the nature of the call. Calling from a public pay
telephone does not require a coin; a pushbutton bypasses the
coin circuits for emergency calls.
In Moscow, calls come into a central dispatching office,
currently located in the Bas administrative headauarters,
which handles all operational command-and-control. Named
"Centropunkt," it is staffed by a total of seventy women,
all of whom have at least two years of medical training.
These are organized into three groups:
(1) First are the 35-40 first-line dispatchers, who
take the calls from the public. They are respon-
sible for questioning the caller, referring him or
her to a clinic or information desk for non-serious
conditions, and assessing the need for a house-car,
line ambulance, or specialty brigade for more
serious conditions. In a minute or less, they must
ascertain the nature of the condition that prompts
the call, what attention, if any, it has received
thus far, who is involved, where the problem is,
and what EMS attention it is likely to require.
In the course of talking with the caller, they
fill out the front side of a standard card, a copy
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of which is displayed in Figure 1. An English
translation of both sides of the card forms Figures
2A and 2B. 7hese forms are kept on file ("lith the
information supplied by the ambulance crew that is
added later), and are nominally available for
analysis.
Once the first-line dispatcher has completed the
card and decided what should be dispatched, the
card is put into a clip on a conveyor belt that
carries it into an adjoining room. (This conveyor
is almost identical to that used in the pre-computer
police dispatching system in New York City.)
(2) In this adjoining room sit 27 second-line dispatchers,
each responsible for one of the ambulance substations.
The card is routed to the appropriate woman [who
determines which substation covers the location of
the incident, and how, was not clear], who trans-
mits the necessary information and the dispatch
order via dedicated telephone line to the substation.
She then maintains radiotelpphone contact with the
ambulances from her substation while they are out.
(3) In the front of the first room sits a panel of
four to six physicians. These women are available
to take calls where their expertise is needed to
question the caller and make a tentative diagnosis
to be used in dispatching the appropriate vehicle.
They also offer medical advice to callers where it
seems appropriate, to enable some preliminary
first-aid to begin while the ambulance is enroute.
Presumably, they can also advise callers not
requiring an ambulance ｷ ｨ ･ ｲ ｾ best to seek help for
their problems.
As one might expect for a system handling such a large
volume of calls, Noscow is moving tOvJC1rd computer--assistance
for the EMS dispatch process. Next to the current offices is
29
Front:
BCI30B
( "., '-"0' -.'r .)ｮ Ｎ Ｇ Ｍ Ｎ ｖ ｾ ｾ ｌ ｊ Ａ ｜ Ｎ ｬ ｾ ｊ ｬ ｬ
ｾ 137 r. Dpuml.1 _
DpmUIT B.. t:JC•• :.\!;;I,
DepC;J:aJl tw,e. M!l;!,
ｂ｢ｬＺＺＳｾ llCpc:3 lr;;<;, . Ml:H. _
B03iJpauret;;;c tIJc. !,HlH,
ｲ ［ Ｑ ｾ Ｐ ｊ Ｎ ｯ ..ＧＱＮｾｉｮｊＱｃＮｊＱｌＱｬＰＺＺＧＺｔＺＺＭ qac. ;'1F:J.
C::rytllLIC C'\':l'fCt:'.:I _
p ＲｪｾｾＮ nc) rOpGr'1Y Ml13c.. ｕ Ｎ ｾ ｉ ｻ Ｎ
opyIL ,...__ '1:1C. L1ll11.
Crii.'UEOll1!, '__"', "lac. ｉ｜ｾｮｬＱＮ
----_..._--------
--------------------------_._---
Ｚ ｾ Ｐ Ｑ Ｌ Ｍ ｉ N'2 I{Opn• . . ｲｾｾＮ ｬｻｏｍｮｾＮｬＱ｡Ｎ __ , ｾＮ __ ｮ ｯ ［ Ｇ ｬ Ｎ ｣ Ａ ［ Ｎ ｊ Ｌ ｾ Ｎ ｻ .._ .. ｟ｾＭｔＺＺＮｩｩｋ __.__......-..._
IJilJ!l3nIIC ｲ Ｇ ｬ ｰ ｃ ｩ ｋ ［ ｊ Ｇ Ｌ ｉ Ｇ ［ ｭ ｾ ll,m npc;o.lIiJl'll·fHll
Ｐ Ｖ Ｑ ｉ ｊ Ｎ ･ ＾ Ｚ ＼ ｈ ｔ ｈ ｾ • _
I\TO !)[,13LI3aeT _ .. .
n.lla ｲＢ｛ｽｾ .. •. _
.__ 6::r;1I{ _
1\op1" ＺＩ［ｾＧｦｰｬｬｈｬｻ｡
C. ＮｾＢＡＩＮＢ J Tllda
3i1l1:I,· ..U
ｾｬｬＧｲＮ
(j"'i,-Cln') __ ,__ Ｎ ｾ ｟
------_...---------_....----- -
Back:
I1pmwlla
-.----------_._--
r ｾＮｕＧＮｇＺｌ［ｈ ｂ｟ｾＮ｟ＮｾＮ . . _
Epa'!
cj) em,;rw" jJ
Me;:;:(,par
UI'Jql('!l __....,...._ .... _.. _
Cr. ｢ｰｾＧＡ｟Ｎ｟Ｎ｟Ｎ __••D.;:CU"::TtICP ,_.
, ,',f
Figure 1: Moscow Emergency Medical Service Call
Record Form
Call
No.
---
EMERGENCY MEDICAL SERVICE CALL ｆｏｾｾ
(Ci ty of f\1oscow)
Form No. 252
Ministry of Health Care of
the USSR - Approved 16 July
1954
197 DATE:
-
TUm OF CALL: HR. [\lIN.
-- --
TIME OF TRANSMISSION HR. MIN.
-- --
DISPATCH TUm: HR. MIN.
-- --
RETURN TIHE: HR. IvlIN.
-- --
DURATION:
RECEIVING OPERATOR _
TRANSMITTING OPERATOR _
URGENCY NOTES
POLICE ON DUTY
TRAFFIC POLICE
INQUIRY
OTHER _
DIVISlOi-i
ADDRESS
w
o
HOUSE NO.
-----,
BLOCK FLAT DOOR STORE
N.IV1E OF INSTITUTION
DORMITORY BLOCK NO.
1 INFECTIOUS DISEASE:
IJ'iliASLES
ENTRANCE FROM STREET
WHO INVOLVED: MEN
':ARD
WOf\1EN
TO RT.
AGE
LEFT CHICKEN POX
SCARLET FEVER
WRITTEN BY:
EVACUATOR!
i
i
I
,,_, .__.L-.'----_._-_._--
TEL. NO.
Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ ｾ ｟ ... ｟ＭＭｾ
REASON FOR CALL:
WHO IS CALLING
Figure 2A: Moscow Emergency Medical Service Call Record Form
(Front - English Translation)
FAMILY NAHE
FIRST NAME
DIAGNOSIS
CAUSE
AGE
SECOND (PATRONYMIC) NAME
HELP GIVEN
\vHERE DELIVERED
WHO ACCEPTED
WHO ACCOMPANIED
W
f-J
DOCTOR
FELDSHER (Nurse)
AMBULANCE TECHNICIAN
DRIVER
SENIOR DOCTOR DISPATCHER
[IF NOT TRANSPORTED]
Left at the Scene (Discharged)
GIVEN TO POLICE
REFUSED TO GO TO HOSPITAL
WERE NOT ABLE TO REACH
PERSON NOT FOUND AT THE PLACE
REFUSED HELP
PLACE NOT FOUND
SPECIAL NOTES
Figure 2B
STATISTICAL OFFICER
Moscow Emergency Service Call Record Form
(Reverse - English Translation)
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being constructed a seven-story modern headquarters building,
which will contain a large ｣ ｯ ｾ ｰ ｵ ｴ ･ ｲ center and a redesigned
dispatching operation. When the computer system is operative,
all the stations and substations will be connected to the
dispatching center with display terminals. All dispatchers
will have display consoles, into which the telephone infor-
mation will be entered. The computer will then retrieve and
display the "necessary dispatch information," presumably
identifying the substation nearest the address, the number
of beds available in the likely specialty area in nearby
hospitals, the status of the crews (e.g., how many line
ambulances in the nearest substation are available for
dispatch, or where the nearest available specialty brigades
are located).
[It would be useful to know what else the computer will
retrieve, or be able to retrieve, and what specific assistance,
if any, it will be programmed to provide, in addition to
status and record bookkeeping. Will the computer assist in
scheduling and routing transport services, for example? Will
it be programmed to suggest diverting lower priority calls to
neighboring SUbstations if one seems in danger of being
stripped? will it assist in telephone interrogation and
dispatch decisions, using analytical tools such as those
described in the following section? T'lhen is the computer
dispatch system expected to go into use?]
5.2 Call Priority Assessment
One of the most critical steps in the dispatch process
is evaluating the information given by the caller to determine
what EMS response should be made. The dispatcher has the
following range of policy alternatives:
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(a) Send no EBS vehicle, and refer the caller to a
clinic or other source of medical care and/or
counselling. Then the caller may not seek care,
or may receive care much later, should there
actually be a serious problem.
(b) Send a house-car, which is likely to reach the
caller within 30 to 120 minutes, depending on
the volume and nature of the calls assigned house
cars and the number of cars available. Should the
condition then prove more serious than had been
thought, the nurse or doctor in the house car can
call for an ambulance, but the time between
initial call and arrival of the ambulance will be
very long.
(c) Send a line-ambulance, which will reach the
person within 8 to 10 minutes and be able to
provide good care then, but may not be able to
cope with truly serious, specialized emergencies.
The line arnbulance can call for a specialty brigade,
but another 10 minutes or more will elapse before
the specialty brigade can reach the scene.
(d) Send a specialty brigade, which can handle very
difficult situations in its specialty, and will
reach the person within 12 to 15 minutes. One
must be sure to send the appropriate specialty
brigade, however. And, if one dispatches the
specialty brigades too often to calls for which
they are not needed, one risks tiring the
physicians (thus lowering their ability to handle
subseauent calls) and possibly ､ ･ ｬ ｾ ｹ ｩ ｮ ｧ their
response to serious calls by having them respond-
ing to or handling calls that line ambulances
could have handled when serious calls come in.
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(e) Send several ambulances, perhaps with specialty
brigades, at once. These situations are usually
clear: natural disasters, builQing collapse,
explosion, train derailment, etc. When the call
indicates ｭ ｾ ｬ ｴ ｩ ｰ ｬ ･ victims, MOscow's dispatchers
always send several vehicles. On one occasion,
Storey and Rcth [4] report, several dozen ambu-
lances were sent within 15 minutes of the initial
call.
Any decision based on imperfect information, such as
is supplied over the telephone by medically untrained
citizens, some of whom may be anxious, or even in panic,
will be subject to statistical type-I and type-!! errors.
That is, sometimes more capability will be dispatched than
is needed, and sometimes less. The balance is a difficult
one between averting risks to the immediate caller and
keeping available resources that may be needed more the next
time the telephone rings.
The basis for the decision is essentially a discriminant
function--either the dispatcher's experienced judgment or a
statistical function, or some combination of the two--that
weights the information received in a way that best discrim-
inates (i.e., minimizes the overlap) between the several
options. The sharper the discrimination that is possible,
the better the decision is likely to be, and the less intricate
the dispatching strategy needs to be to minimize over-all risk.
Two kinds of information are available to aid in the
discrimination: ｾ priori estimates based on historical data,
and information elicited from the particular caller. Extrap-
olating from historical data, of course, ｢ ｵ ｾ ｬ ､ ｳ in important
assumptions about stationarity of patterns, and gives only
statistical estimates. Yet, since alarm patterns in Moscow
are said to vary significantly by time of day, day of week,
- ｾ -
season, and locality, one should be able to gain significant
a priori estimates of the probability that a given call will
require a line ambulance, or will need a specialty brigade.
[If such analyses have been done, they would be of consider-
able interest. Both the methods and the data would be
important in illustrative examples for the book.]
Going further, Dr. Beskrovny and his colleagues in
Moscow have developed methods to evaluate the content of
calls by analogy with past experience. That is, they have
gone through large numbers of call-record cards, comparing
the initial information the dispatcher received with the final
hospital diagnosis. Using decision theory and factor analysis,
they have developed discriminants for the call contents that
best indicate high-priority situations. A check list of
critical indicators has been developed for the dispatchers;
when the caller reports symptoms on the list, a line ambulance
(or, when indicated, a specialty brigade) ffi 1 st be sent. In
balancing possible errors, they try to keep low the risk of
rejecting true emergency calls.
The discriminant need not be employed as often in low-
demand periods, when dispatchers feel freer to send more
capability than may be needed, and thus avoid risk to the
caller. In high-demand periods (EMS "rush hours"), it is
more important. Trials are now underway using these analyt-
ical results in Moscow's rush-hour dispatching. In the
session, it was claimed that these trials showed excellent
results. Without analysis, dispatchers made roughly 1 error
(dispatching too little) in every 50 calls; with the analysis,
this rate had been reduced by 94 to 96 percent--i.e., to
roughly 1 error in 1000 calls.
This analysis seems clearly to be one of the leading
examples of applying decision-theoretic technioues to the
crucial problem of dispatching discrimination. It should
clearly be reported, in at least some methodological detail,
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in the state-of-the-art monograph [1]. Though it has been
said that publication should await the results of the testing
now underway, expected to be completed in rnid-1976, partial
publication in the monograph, with appropriate credits and
caveats, would seem quite valuable for Moscow. Using this
analysis as one of the "case studies," representing it as
"being tested for possible operational use," if that were its
status at the time of publication, would show clearly the
advanced state of analytic and managerial art in Moscow,
and help give its Er1S the recognition it would appear to
have earned.
5.3 Quality Control
An important feature of EMS management in Moscow is
quality control, particularly with regard to the medical care
provided. One means of effecting quality control is through
systematic evaluation of a random sample of cases. An
evaluation group is set up with one person from each sub-
station. A sample of cases is drawn from the records and
examined in detail. Analysis is done, for example, to com-
pare the crew's diagnosis and treatment with the diagnosis
ultimately made in the hospital and the patient's resulting
condition. In addition, the cases are discussed for their
medical features, as part of a program in continuing medical
education. [How often this is done, with how many cases,
was not stated. Any evaluation of these evaluations would
also be of interest.]
At a higher level, special analyses are undertaken by
the central Skoraya office in the Ministry 'of Health Care.
These use "exchange cards," records from one jurisdiction
given to another to analyze. From these are developed
studies that examine the interface between the EMS and the
hospitals to which they bring their patients, and also look
critically at the follow-up care in the hospitals.
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6. Agenda for Action
The preceding sections show, albeit with less than
scientific detail, that the noscow EI!'ergency Hedical Service:
o Hay be among the best such ｳ ･ ｲ ｶ ｩ ｣ Ｈ ｾ ｳ in any large ci ty;
o Has carried ｯ ｵ ｾ and applied systeD analytic studies
in several important areas, some of which appear to
be on the ｦ ｯ ｲ ･ ｾ ｲ ｯ ｮ ｴ of the state-of-the-art;
o Desires and should obtain for its accomplishments in
analysis, planning, and management wider recognition
among Western experts;
o Should be described in detail as an illustrative
"case study" of high-quality, advanced practices
in the IIASA state-of-the-art monogrdph, "Analysis,
Planriing and Management of Urban ｾ ｭ ･ ｲ ｧ ･ ｮ ｣ ｹ Services."
Such a description could help achieve considerable
recognition. To present and document it, however,
requires additional information.
Details of specific needs for additional information are
noted at intervals throughout the paper. This section
summarizes these open questions (referring to the correspond-
ing points in the paper) in the form of an agenda for one
part of follow-up meetings and discussions.
The second part of this section notes some ｾ ｡ ｪ ｯ ｲ points
that the author could present as part of a comprehensive
discussion of research advances and practices in other
countries. A brief outline of the possible comprehensive
discussion forms the third part of this section.
Together, the parts of this section present an agenda
for a further exchange of information and ideas, one that
should lead to action in the form of a documented "case
study" of applied systems analysis to be presented in [1].
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6.1 Open ｑ ｵ ･ ｾ ｴ ｩ ｯ ｮ ｾ
(1) What preventive activities are carried out by the
Moscow EMS? How many people are assigned to them? Have any
evalualions or assessments of these activities been conducted?
If so, what methods were used, what data were collected and
analyzed, and what were the results? If the analysis is
considered worthwhile, can its details be made available?
(Reference: p. 14)
(2) How many specialty brigades of each type are now
provided? Does the number vary with time of day, day of the
week, etc.? If so, in what manner? How many specialty
brigades of each type are planned for the future? What
assessment of their value has been made, and what did it show?
(Reference: p. 16)
(3) What methods were used to determine the number and
location of new ambulance substations, when the expansion
took place from 22 to 27 over the past few years? If analyt-
ical models were used, are details available to be documented
as part of an applications "case study?" (Reference: p. 18)
(4) What queueing models are used to determine the
number of ambulances that must be provided at each substation?
What are the system protocols (rules) for call priorities,
queueing of low-priority calls, shunting of calls to other
services or neighboring substations, inter-district dispatch-
ing? How are these reflected in the analyses? hThat values
are used for the "cut-off" probability in the models?
(Reference: p. 22)
(5) What are the actual data for call rates (classified
by type of incident) by time of day, day of week, season,
etc.? Can data be released to provide illustrative examples
for a "case study," with whatever analyses have been done to
analyze trends, to forecast expected future demands, to
determine the a priori probabilities of call types by time
of day, etc.? (Reference: p. 24)
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(6) What studies have been done to assess the marginal
value of decreased response time for ambulances? Have studies
been done of the possihility of increasing the number of
ambulance substations substantially (e.g., from 27 to IOO)?
If so, can details be made available for inclusion in the
"case study?" (Reference: pp. 25-26).
(7) In the present dispatching system, who is responsible
for determining which substation covers the location from which
a call has been received? What means are used to make this
determination (e.g., a street-address directory)? Will this
matching of location with substation be done automatically
in the new computer dispatching system? (Reference: p. 28)
(8) What are the functional specifications for the new
computer dispatching system--that is, what things-.will it do
that are now done manually? Will it contain algorithms to
assist the dispatchers with complex decisions, or will it
mainly retrieve pre-planned and pre-progranwed lists of
information and do routine bookkeepin9? Can the details of
the new system be explained for description in the "case
study?" (Reference: p. 32)
(9) Even though testing of the analysis continues to
be done, can the details of the important work analyzing the
content of calls to help discriminate among dispatching
alternatives be described for inclusion in the "case study?"
What models have been used? What data was collected, and
what analysis of it was done? What tentativE results have
been obtained? What have been the preliminary results of
testing to date? What are the questions the dispatcher is
instructed to ask, and what are the corresponding inter-
pretations in terms of probable diagnosis? What risk levels
have been used to make the trade-off between the possibility
of dispatching less than is needed and the chance of making
unavailable an important unit that may be needed more for a
subsequent call? Ｈ ｒ ･ ｦ ･ ｲ ｾ ｮ ｣ ･ Ｚ Section 5.2)
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(10) Can an example case analysis used for quality
control be made available for examination? (Reference:
section 5.3)
6.2 Principles That Might Be Tested in the USSR EMS
System
Some examples of principles that might be discussed,
for possible testing in the USSR EMS system, include:
(A) Computer-aided diagnosis, both with and without
the use of bio-telemetry;
(B) Use of helicopters in urban areas and urbanized
regions;
(C) Deployment of ambulances in more widely distributed
patterns to reduce response times, with dynamic
positioning strategies and algorithms that could
be used in the new computer ｳ ｹ ｳ ｴ ･ ｾ to achieve
operational gains perhaps not now possible;
(D) Dispatching strategies to be comhined with the
discriminant analysis to reduce further risks
in the use of ambulances and specialty brigades;
(E) Possible variations in manp0wer policies to enhance
service effectiveness.
Details can be presented for the topics of greatest interest.
6.3 International Research and Practice
Building on information obtained in ten advanced nations,
it may be of interest to describe findings being synthesized
from research and practice in the following general areas:
o Principles of management for services
o Methods of long-range planning in emergency services
o Methods for analyzing complex systems within which
EMS operate
o Assessment of preventive programs, and development
of possible new preventive policies
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o Policies for dispatching and dispatching management
o Policies for reducing the time from ｯ ｣ ｾ ｵ ｲ ｲ ･ ｮ ｣ ･ of
severe injury or disease until service begins
o Development of ｾ ･ ｷ technologies
o Uses of computers in emergency operations and
management.
Details can be presented for the topics of greatest interest.
- 42 -
References
[1] Blum, E.H., et al., "Analysis, Planning, and Management
of Urban Emergency Services," Prospectus for a
monograph in the IIASA Series, Systems Analysis:
State-of-the-Art, WP-75-l36, March 1975.
[2] Blum, E.H., "Emergency Hedical Services: System Con-
siderations," WP-75-l37, October 1975.
[3] Jackson, J.O., "Moscow's Efficient Ambulance Service,"
Chicago Tribune, March 1, 1975, Section 1, p. 10.
[4] Storey, P.B. and R.B. Roth, "Emergency Medical Care in
the Soviet Union--A Study of Skoraya," Journal of
American Medical Association, 217, 588-592 (August
2, 1971). - .
[5] Osnos, P., "Russian Facilities Aid U.S. Drug Work on
Heart Attack Patients," reprinted from the
Washington Post in the International Herald Tribune,
June 2, 1975.
[6] Ofer, G., The Service Sector in Soviet Economic Growth,
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., USA,
1973.
[7] ｖ ｾ ｶ ｵ ｬ ｩ ｮ ｡ Ｌ N.N., "Status of Specialized Medical First
Aid to the Population of the RSFSR," Sov. Med., 36,
6:129-132 (June 1973). English translation avail-
able as Report JPRS-60430, U.S. National Technical
Information Service.
[8] Private communication, July 1975.
ARTICLES CONCERNING USSR EMERGENCY MEDICAL SERVICES
Articles in English:
[9] Andreev, G. et al., "Some Problems of Critical Care
Medicine in the Soviet Union," Critical Care Medicine,
1:43-44 (January - February 1973).
[10] Petrovsky, C.C. et al., "Emergency Medical Services in
the USSR," Med. J. Aust., 1:758-760 (May 11, 1974).
[11] Raithaus, L. et al., "Emergency Medical Service in the
Soviet Union," Critical Care Medicine, 2:64-67
(March - April 1974).
- 43 -
[12] Scribner I R., et al., "Emergency Medical Service in the
Soviet Union," J. Trauma, 14:447-452 (June 1974)
Articles in Sov. Zdravookhr., in Russian with English abstracts:
[13] Volume ｾ (1973)
Kustova, E.A., "Basic Patterns in the Receipt of Calls
for Medical First Aid According to Time in Different
Types Of Cities," pp.ll-lS
Arbakov, A.I' I "Requirements of a City Population for
Emergency Outpatient Medical Aid in Diseases of
the Circulatory System," pp.22-27
Kustova, E.A., "Method for Determining the Standards of
Urban Population Need for Emergency Outpatient
Medical Aid," pp.30-36
Arbakov l A.I., "Use of the Mathematical Apparatus of
the Queueing Theory in Determining the Population
Demand for Cardiological Medical First-Aid Brigades,"·
pp.3S-39
Kotliarenko, M.L., "Determination of the Cost of a
Medical First Aid Call," pp.39-42
Arbakov, A.I., "Scope of Medical First Ai.d Rendered by
Specialized Cardiological Brigades," pp.42-46
Kustova, E.A., "Level and Structure of Population Demand
for Emergency Outpatient Medical Aid in Cities of
Different Types," pp.46-S0
Roitman, M.P., "Computing the Optimal Utilization of
Beds in Wards Rendering Emergency Aid," pp.S6-57
[14] Volume 33 (1974)
Kustova, E.A., "Nature of Activity of the Emergency
Centers in Cities of Different Types," pp.23-26
Kotliarenko, M.L., "Attendance for Medical First Aid by
the Population of Alma-Ata / " pp.26-28
Articles in Russian
[15] Komarov, B.D., et al., "Achievements of Soviet Emergency
Aid in the Past 50 years," Sov. Med., 36:130-134
(Feb.1973)
- 44 -
[16] Stepanov, A.G., et al., "Possibilities of Shortening the
Time-consuming Effort of Loading Wounded onto Com-
pact Vehicles for Medical Evacuation," Voen. Med. Zh.,
9:19-22 (Sept. 1973)
